Random thought about Zizek and the perversity of analyzing ideology

Today, it seemed to me, and I thought I would share with YOU, whoever you are, that Zizek is doing a sort of inverted teleology - for lack of a better term I will call it ideological teleology.

If teleology is any philosophical account which holds that final causes exist in nature then Zizek is doing the "converse": He presumes a "natural" account (and by extension a deductively created meta-ideological reckoning) which holds that final causes exist in philosophy. That is to say the truth of the matter is driven backwards from an aggregation of existing "natural" logical-entities/frameworks/ideologies and then things are rearranged and flipped and spun to negate that aggregated/surveyed framework - i.e. the truth lies outside the current meta-ideological reckoning, but the work of finding it is done empirically and thus the belated "actual" truth is arrived at "honestly" at the cost of obliqueness and cohesion.

For example when asked about how he would go about accounting for the paradox of the emphasis of "freedom" (and thus culpability, guilt and persecution) in Stalinism, Zizek replied: "What I aim at in my rethinking of all of these problems is precisely not to draw this conclusion." ("this conclusion" being the expected and normal current tropes and thinking of the specific philosophy/meta-ideology at hand - i.e. what everyone else thinks the answer is). Footnote: Of course this one example is hardly proof, I present it as merely a possible example; with Stalinism he probably has a multitude of other reasons to want to come to a conclusion outside the current thinking.

He surveys the ideological landscape (the pre-existing natural set of beliefs and reactions to a topic) then he sets about, in an inverted-teleological way, making things fit the final cause, which is: there is a new simple truth that lies outside of the current consensus or analysis.

I am not simply saying that Zizek thinks other people are wrong and he is right (although I am sure he thinks that as well) - what I am saying is that there is an unconscious ideological teological first principle lurking in the background of any framing of truth or philosophical anaylsis. This accounts for his constant need to find shocking philosophical reversals in everything and this, of course, is the source of his current popularity I think. But it is not egotism or a desperate need to be right that is the engine behind all this, but rather a meta-ideological dogma and deductive first principle: philosophy is always as yet uncovered. And it goes without saying but I will say it: This is an inevitable pathological result of obsession with Hegelian processes, which, as far as I am concerned, form the only stable meta-meta-ideological teleology - not that anyone wants or needs such things to do philosophy but there are structural constraints on any such perversity and I think Hegel has already done the legwork of fleshing those possibilities out. None are left. Although that would make a fun topic for further posts.